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Abstract
We examine implemented systems for ethical machine
reasoning with a view to identifying the practical chal-
lenges (as opposed to philosophical challenges) posed
by the area. We identify a need for complex ethical ma-
chine reasoning not only to be multi-objective, proac-
tive, and scrutable but that it must draw on hetero-
geneous evidential reasoning. We also argue that, in
many cases, it needs to operate in real time and be
verifiable. We propose a general architecture involving
a declarative ethical arbiter which draws upon multi-
ple evidential reasoners each responsible for a partic-
ular ethical feature of the system’s environment. We
claim that this architecture enables some separation of
concerns among the practical challenges that ethical
machine reasoning poses.
Introduction
There has been an explosion of interest in Ethics and
Artificial Intelligence as evidenced by several high pro-
file initiatives considering the issue such as the IEEE
Global Initiative on Ethics in Artificial Intelligence
and Autonomous Systems and the BSI Standard 8611:
Guide to the Ethical Design and Application of Robots
and Robotic Systems. While these initiatives generally
take a wide-ranging view of the subject considering ev-
erything from the deployment of autonomous weapons,
the societal impact from the potential loss of jobs, to the
privacy issues that result from big data and social me-
dia they also consider, as a topic, the implementation of
ethical reasoning in machines, often referred to as ma-
chine ethics but which we will here refer to as ethical
machine reasoning in order to highlight our considera-
tion of computational reasoning about ethical issues.
One of the key challenges facing the implementation
of ethical machine reasoning is that no consensus exists
on the nature of morality, the key moral values, how
morals relate to ethical rules and how competing eth-
ical rules can be decided between in specific contexts.
We will refer to these issues as philosophical challenges
facing the implementation of ethical machine reasoning.
∗The work in this paper was supported by the EPSRC
“Verifiable Autonomy” project (EP/L024845)
In this paper we contend that there are a range of
other challenges faced by ethical machine reasoning
which would make it a challenging area of artificial in-
telligence even if the philosophical challenges were re-
solved. These practical challenges relate to questions of
how ethical reasoning is to be implemented. They let
us identify the implementation of ethical machine rea-
soning as a distinct sub-field of automated reasoning in
general and demonstrate that it is not possible to sat-
isfactorily implement ethical machine reasoning simply
by taking pre-existing automated reasoning techniques
and applying them to the ethical theory of your choice.
In this paper we seek to understand the practical
challenges that characterise machine ethics. We frame
this understanding around the discussion of existing
systems that claim to implement ethical reasoning and
propose a general software architecture for ethical ma-
chine reasoning which would support a variety of solu-
tions to these challenges.
Survey of Ethical Machine Reasoning
Implementations
All machine reasoning systems can be viewed a ethical
reasoning systems from some level of abstraction, so
we here restrict ourselves to systems that are explicitly
ethical in the sense of Moor (Moor 2006) (i.e., they
reason explicitly about ethical concepts). There are
few examples of such systems and we view the main
ones here – our purpose in doing so is to highlight the
practical issues faced by the implementation of ethical
machine reasoning.
Ethical Governors
The first implementation of ethical machine reasoning is
generally credited to Arkin et. al, of the Georgia Tech
Mobile Robot Lab (Arkin, Ulam, and Duncan 2009;
Arkin, Ulam, and Wagner 2012) who outline the archi-
tecture for an ethical governor for automated targeting
systems for autonomous weapons. This governor was
charged with ensuring that any use of lethal force was
governed by the “Law of War”, the “Rules of Engage-
ment” and was proportional.
The governor was implemented as a separate module
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that intercepted signals from the underlying delibera-
tive system and, where these signals involved lethal-
ity, would go through a process of evidential reason-
ing which amassed information about the situation in
a logical form and would then reason about the evi-
dence using constraints represented as prohibitions and
obligations. If any prohibitions were violated or obli-
gations unfulfilled then the proposed action would be
vetoed. If no prohibition were violated then the gover-
nor would proceed to a “collateral damage” estimation
phase and attempt to find a combination of weapon sys-
tem, targeting pattern and release position that would
maximise the likelihood of neutralising the target while
minimising collateral damage.
The authors note that “it is a major assumption of
this research that accurate target discrimination with
associated uncertainty measures can be achieved de-
spite the fog of war” and the case studies they perform
using their implementation are based on this assump-
tion and provide appropriate information up front as
part of the scenario.
This initial work on ethical governors was then re-
implemented in a new setting of healthcare (Shim and
Arkin 2017). In this setting the ethical governor moni-
tors not an underlying autonomous system but the in-
teractions between a patient with Parkinson’s Disease
and a caregiver. The reasoning behind such a mon-
itoring system is that sufferers from Parkinson’s Dis-
ease frequently lose control of their facial musculature,
this means that many non-verbal cues and interactions
between patient and care-giver are lost which can re-
sult in stigmatisation between a caregiver and patient
and a decrease in the quality of patient care. This eth-
ical governor combines an evidential reasoner with a
rule-based system (as opposed to a constraint reason-
ing system) but the basic architecture is the same. The
evidential reasoner produces an assessment of the en-
vironment based on cues such as raised voices which
are represented in a logical form. The rule-based sys-
tem then reasons about this logical information in order
to select appropriate intervening actions such as verbal
interventions or indicative gestures.
GenEth
The GenEth system (Anderson and Anderson 2014)
is designed as an ethical dilemma analyzer. Its pur-
pose is twofold. Firstly, it demonstrates how input
from professional ethicists can be used via a process of
machine learning to create a principle of ethical action
preference1 which can be applied to situations in order
to determine appropriate action. GenEth analyses a
given situation in order to determine its ethical features
(e.g., that harm may befall a patient in some health-
care scenario), these features then give rise to duties
(to minimize or maximize that feature). The principle
of ethical action preference is used to compare two op-
1We note that the terminology of ethical principles is
used widely but inconsistently throughout the literature.
tions: each option is assigned a score for each relevant
ethical feature, the difference between these two scores
is then used by the principle which partitions the n-
dimensional space defined by the feature comparisons
(one dimension for each feature) into regions using in-
equalities. Each partition of the space specifies which
of the compared actions is to be preferred in that region
so, for instance if the first action is significantly worse in
terms of privacy than the second (e.g., the difference in
their score on the privacy feature is greater than 2) but
the second action is a little worse in terms of patient
safety (e.g., the difference in their score is less than -1)
then the partition might specify that the first action is
to be preferred.
Initially GenEth was implemented as a standalone
system which was used to capture information from
medical ethicists on decisions that should be made in
particular, manually generated, scenarios. It has sub-
sequently been connected as a decision-making compo-
nent on top of a simulator for Nao robots (Anderson,
Anderson, and Berenz 2016) and evaluated in scenar-
ios where the robot must choose between six possible
actions (such as charging itself, reminding a patient to
take medication, and notifying an overseer of problems).
These actions are evaluated on an ongoing basis using
a principle which considers eight ethical features (hon-
our commitments, maintain readiness, minimise harm,
maximise good, minimise non-interaction, respect au-
tonomy and maximise the prevention of immobility).
GenEth is able to give explanations for its decisions
in terms of its partition of the space – so it can state how
two options compared on the various ethical features in
its judgement and refer to the statement of the principle
to then justify the subsequent choice.
Ethical Consequence Engines
Winfield et. al, of the Bristol Robotics Lab (Winfield,
Blum, and Liu 2014; Vanderelst and Winfield 2016)
have investigated systems based on the concept of an
Ethical Consequence Engine. This consequence engine
uses simulation to evaluate the impact of actions on
the environment. In particular it simulates not just the
actions of the robot itself but also simulates the activ-
ity of other agents in the environment, based on some
simplifying assumptions about movement and intended
destinations of humans and other robots. This allows
the robot to determine not only if its actions have di-
rectly negative consequences (e.g., colliding with a per-
son) but if they have indirectly negative consequences
(e.g., failing to intercept a person who might otherwise
come into danger).
There are two versions of the ethical consequence en-
gine system the first of which (Winfield, Blum, and Liu
2014) was implemented on e-Puck robots and evalu-
ated all possible actions in the environment based on a
discritization of the space of operation, while the sec-
ond (Vanderelst and Winfield 2016) was implemented
on Nao robots and used a sampling procedure to evalu-
ate a specific sub-set of options. Each option is scored
using various metrics such as the closeness of any hu-
mans to “danger”, the closeness of the robot to “dan-
ger” and the closeness of the robot to its goal. These
metrics are then combined in a weighted sum and the
highest scoring option chosen. The first of these sys-
tems was also verified (Dennis, Fisher, and Winfield
2015) in a process that involved converting the metric
based evaluation of the robot actions into logic based
reasoning over outcomes that compared the severity of
the outcome and who suffered the concequences (human
or robot).
Ethan
The Ethan system (Dennis et al. 2016a) was developed
to investigate ethical decision making in exceptional cir-
cumstances with a particular emphasis on verifiability.
In the Ethan system a rational agent, based on the
Beliefs-Desires-Intentions model of agency (Rao and
Georgeff 1995) was used to reason about the ethical
risks of plans proposed by an underlying planning sys-
tem. In this system the operation of reasoning in nor-
mal circumstances was assumed to be ethical by default
(i.e., there was an assumption that appropriate ethi-
cal properties were guaranteed by a process of testing
or verification of the decision-making process) but that
in exceptional circumstances the system might need to
make use of Artificial Intelligence techniques such as
planning or learning which are inherently challenging
to verification. (Dennis et al. 2016a) considers the case
of a planning system that returns candidate plans to the
agent which are annotated with any ethical principles2
impacted by the plan. The case study looked at scenar-
ios involving unmanned aircraft and plans were anno-
tated with the nature of any collisions that might take
place or violations of the Rules of the Air. Ethan then
reasoned using a context specific ethical policy which
imposed an ordering on plans based upon the ethical
principles they violated.
Model Checking (Clarke, Grumberg, and Peled 1999)
was then applied to the Ethan agent in order to verify
a number of properties, including that the agent was
programmed to correctly obey the specified ethical pol-
icy – i.e., that if it selected a plan that violated some
ethical principle then this was only because all the other
available options were worse.
Observed Features
We can observe a number of features both individually
and jointly across these systems that begin to define the
space of practical challenges that face systems seeking
to implement explicit ethical reasoning.
Multi-Objective
While terminology across these systems is inconsistent
we note that all of them operate on the assumption that
the situation in which the system finds itself may have a
2These can be considered broadly equivalent to
GenEth’s ethical features.
number of potential ethical impacts – whether these are
referred to as ethical features, ethical principles, ethical
constraints or by some other language. We will refer to
these as ethical features for convenience.
While we anticipate that in most everyday reasoning
situations at most one ethical feature is at stake – i.e.,
in many cases none of the available options have par-
ticular ethical features (answering the front door, for
instance) – in nearly all cases the point of the ethical
reasoning is to limit goal-directed behaviour according
to ethical considerations (though some of the systems
treat goal-directed behaviour as an ethical feature ex-
pressed, for instance, as obedience to the human). How-
ever, consideration of ethical features rapidly leads to
the conclusion that there will be situations where the
system must somehow choose between them, as well as
limiting goal-directed behaviour. So GenEth has its
partitioning of the space that compares individual op-
tions according to their ethical features, Ethan has its
context-dependent ethical policy while the Ethical Con-
sequence Engine prioritises humans over robots, and
within that the extent of the harm that may befall the
agent.
We note that this makes ethical reasoning inher-
ently multi-objective which is a practical challenge
to many techniques for controlling decision-making in
machines. In particular this kind of reasoning is chal-
lenging for techniques that seek to maximize or mini-
mize some value for while at a very abstract level we can
say the point of ethical reasoning is to maximise human
well-being (as suggested by (Dignum et al. 2017)) this
is not a concept easily captured in a function. Instead
abstract concepts such as well-being are concretized as
ethical features – ethical machine reasoning then be-
comes about deciding what balance among these fea-
tures is most likely to improve or preserve human well-
being (or some equivalent abstract general value)3.
It is tempting to drop down to a lower level and utilise
multi-objective optimisation (Miettinen 1998), but this
works against many other features we require such as
scrutability and verifiability.
Heterogenous Evidential Reasoning
The Ethical Governor systems are the only approaches
that explicitly describe their architecture as consist-
ing of first an evidential reasoner which translates sen-
sory information into a logical form and then a second
reasoner that makes a decision based upon the logical
translation. However both GenEth and Ethan also
take something approaching this form, assuming that
information has been expressed in some logical or equa-
tional form for use by the system. Interestingly the case
studies presented for all these systems either adopt very
simple evidential reasoning mechanisms, or use some or-
3We probably need to accept that in the absence of an
agreed philosophical framework for morality, the best any
feature-based reasoning can hope to achieve is choosing the
right outcome most of the time.
acle to provide information in an appropriate form and
focus on the subsequent reasoning.
While the ethical consequence engines do not use a
logical expression of data, they too crucially involve an
evidential reasoning phase by using a simulator to make
predictions about the outcomes of actions. It is also
clear, particularly in (Winfield, Blum, and Liu 2014)
that although the simulation results are converted to
metrics and then employed in a utility function it is en-
visaged that this captures logical-style reasoning about
the severity of outcomes and the relative importance of
humans and robots.
The ethical consequence engines use simulation to
make predications about safety outcomes, but it is easy
to see that simulation is not effective in, for instance,
establishing risks to human free will and autonomy and
while simulations of information flows might be suffi-
cient to determine privacy risks in social media settings,
it is unlikely to be sufficient when considering informa-
tion flow around smaller groups of people such as fam-
ilies and health workers. An ethical machine reasoning
system operating on a complex set of ethical features
will need to use a variety of heterogeneous mecha-
nisms to perform evidential reasoning about the
situation it finds itself in.
The nature of this heterogeneous evidential reasoning
appears to be a particularly under-explored aspect of
ethical machine reasoning, even given the relative youth
of the field and the small number of implemented sys-
tems. It is also of note that the ethical features consid-
ered by the ethical systems we survey vary wildly, some-
times within a given system – for instance the GenEth
case study (Anderson, Anderson, and Berenz 2016) con-
siders both “readiness” (which relates primarily to how
much charge the robot has) and the far more abstract
concept of “good” as ethical features. Ethan treats
“Do not collide with people” and “Do not collide with
aircraft” as distinct ethical features despite the fact that
both are clearly related to safety. Understanding of
what makes a suitable ethical feature, as an atomic con-
cept for ethical machine reasoning and whether there is
some heirarchy among these (e.g., safety is associated
with features specifying whose safety), and the extent
to which they need to be annotated with, for instance
the degree of severity of the impact and the uncertainty
about the outcome, is lacking and is a challenge that
clearly has both practical and philosophical aspects.
Real Time
Most of these systems have had to make some compro-
mise with the real time aspects of ethical reasoning in
machines. We note that this is not always the case.
The ethical governor system that mediates between pa-
tient and care-giver has more time available for reason-
ing than does the ethical consequence engine must react
quickly to prevent an accident and in general we can en-
visage advisory systems for committees of people that
would have minutes rather than fractions of a second
for deliberation.
However, as a general observation, ethical machine
reasoning must often perform complex reasoning in
real time.
Proactivity
Most of the implementations we have surveyed are reac-
tive – i.e., their purpose is to veto or order plans/actions
suggested by the underlying system. However several of
them acknowledge a need for proactivity – the ability
not only to veto plans but to suggest separate courses of
action. This is most obvious in the Ethical Consequence
Engine in which the whole point of the experiment is
to divert the robot away from its goal-directed task for
ethical reasons, but also in the intervening ethical gov-
ernor which does nothing unless ethical considerations
prompt an intervention.
In the initial implementation of the ethical conse-
quence engine (Winfield, Blum, and Liu 2014) the un-
derlying engine suggested all possible alternatives to the
governor via a discretization process. However the later
version (Vanderelst and Winfield 2016) presented only
a limited number of options for practical reasons – these
options were generated by the underlying control sys-
tem which was therefore clearly implicitly using ethi-
cal considerations in order to generate options for the
ethical layer. Researchers at Bristol Robotics Lab are
now seeking to have the ethical layer request options it-
self if those generated by the underlying controller are
deemed insufficiently ethical4 and this would be the first
concrete implementation of ethical proactivity in such
systems.
More generally, particularly in cases where the ethical
principle of human free will is concerned, it may be nec-
essary for an ethical reasoner to go through an informa-
tion discovery process in order to determine the wishes
of the persons it is interacting with and the strength of
those wishes before deciding whether or not it is ethical
to intervene. For instance, it is a well established prin-
ciple that people should be allowed to smoke in their
own homes but considerable societal resource is put into
making sure they are aware of the risks associated with
smoking. We might want a home-support robot to con-
firm that a home-owner was aware of the dangers of
smoking but, if they were, to thereafter allow them to
smoke without intervention.
Scrutability
In general it is desirable for a number of reasons that we
should be able to understand how a machine reasons:
for instance in order to predict its behaviour, and diag-
nose errors. However this is particular important where
ethical reasoning is concerned. Indeed Moor’s classifi-
cation of ethical machine agents specifies that explicit
agents, such as we consider here, should be able to jus-
tify their choices (Moor 2006).
While moral philosophy has reached no consensus
about whether morality is absolute or relative and soci-
4Paul Bremner, personal communication.
etally determined, we view ethical machine reasoning as
reasoning about circumstances where a systems actions
may impact on the values of a community or individual.
Moor refers to these as ethical impact agents. If some
concept has attained the status of a moral value, then it
has assumed a place of critical importance. Therefore,
while people may accept (even if they are irritated) that
their SatNav sometimes chooses strange routes without
explanation, they are less likely to accept that some sys-
tem has chosen to violate their privacy and can offer no
explanation for why it did so. The ability to understand
how a system has reached some decision is variously re-
ferred to as explainability or scrutability.
There are a number of forms scrutability (Caminada
et al. 2014) can take, from being able to inspect de-
sign/requirements documents that set out the rules of
ethical behaviour the robot is following to the ability to
extract an explanation from the robot after a decision
that has been made to justify that decision or recon-
struct the decision-making process after some problem
arises (e.g., an ethical black box (Winfield and Jirotka
2017)).
We see this need for scrutability in a number of the
systems we survey. Both the ethical governors and
GenEth can explicitly justify their reasoning and the
use of BDI style agents in Ethan also points to this
concern, since their reasoning is based upon logic pro-
gramming, which in turn is based upon logical deduc-
tion using explicit rules. While such derivations can
be complex to follow they are designed to mimic an
account of human reasoning.
Verifiability
A key value in (arguably) all human societies is human
well-being, which manifests ethically as considerations
around human safety (among other things). Where a
system is deemed to be safety critical we are used to
requiring high standards of verification. We would ar-
gue that these considerations extend to ethically critical
systems. If a value is of sufficient importance to a com-
munity to be considered a moral value then we should
expect high standards of verification for any system
with the potential to have a serious negative impact on
that value.
Since, as we have noted, it is beyond our capability
to simply insist autonomous systems maximise human
well-being we are instead forced to encode ethical rea-
soning as a set of rules and these sets of rules are likely
to be complex – for instance even the fairly simple case
study examined in (Anderson, Anderson, and Berenz
2016) partitions the space of options into 13 regions,
each representing a different combination of the ethi-
cal features of a situation. There is therefore scope for
error both in implementing a stated set of rules into a
machine and expressing the rules so that they do indeed
reflect our values. Both (Dennis, Fisher, and Winfield
2015) and (Dennis et al. 2016a) consider formal prop-
erties for machine ethics systems that can be checked
by model-checking so long as the system itself has been
implemented with such verifiability in mind.
Architecture: Multiple Ethical
Governors
We propose a generic architecture for ethical reason-
ing shown in Figure 1. In this architecture an ethical
arbiter reasons using evidence provided by a number
of evidential reasoners each of which is customised to
reason appropriately about some particular ethical fea-
ture of the domain. The underlying autonomous sys-
tem communicates its options to the ethical arbiter,
these options are assessed by the evidential reasoners
which convert information about the options into a log-
ical or equational form which the ethical arbiter then
reasons over. The ethical arbiter then communicates
the result of this reasoning back to the autonomous
system. The arbiter itself should be declarative in na-
Autonomous System Politeness Reasoner
Dignity Reasoner
Privacy Reasoner
Safety Reasoner
Ethical
Arbiter
Figure 1: An Architecture for Ethical Machine Reason-
ing
ture (i.e. the programming should focus on expressing
the logic of the computation as opposed to its control
flow). Declarative programming supports scrutability
at design time (since the program itself should focus
on the outcomes of execution as opposed to how those
outcomes are generated) and declarative programming
paradigms in general also have better support for ver-
ification. Logic programs, BDI agents and constraint
reasoners are all examples of declarative programs.
One advantage we claim for this architecture is it al-
lows us to allocate some of the challenges faced by eth-
ical machine reasoning to different parts of the system.
Scrutability and multi-objective reasoning are the pre-
serve of the ethical arbiter, while real time concerns can
be partitioned into those requiring real time evaluation
of the situation (which is the concern of the eviden-
tial reasoners) and efficient declarative reasoning (the
concern of the arbiter). The modularity also gives us
the potential to verify the ethical reasoning itself sep-
arately (e.g., following the methodology in (Dennis et
al. 2016b)) from any verification of the accuracy of the
evidential reasoners.
In Figure 1, we have included a “politeness reasoner”.
This is because many of the considerations that apply
to ethical machine reasoning we believe also apply to
machine reasoning about social norms – in particular
that such reasoning is multi-objective and needs to be
proactive. It is therefore possible to imagine such an
architecture being extended to cover more general nor-
mative reasoning as well as specifically ethical reason-
ing.
Many design choices exist within this architecture
such as whether the evidential reasoners and/or the
arbiter can suggest or request new actions/plans; the
nature of the evidence produced (which could poten-
tially contain information pertaining to certainty, sever-
ity, who is impacted, how many people are impacted
and so on); what constitutes an atomic ethical feature
that grounds out reasoning; and so on. The architec-
ture also allows rich or sparse logics to be used by the
arbiter.
Conclusion
We here address the challenges posed by explicit ethical
machine reasoning that are not related specifically to
the philosophical uncertainty surrounding the subject
matter.
We have argued that explicit ethical machine rea-
soning faces challenges relating to its multi-objective
nature, its frequent requirement for real time process,
the heterogenous nature of the evidence it needs to rea-
son about and challenges relating to its scrutability and
verifiability. Taken together we believe these challenges
make ethical machine reasoning a sub-field of interest
not just to philosophers and those interested in formal
reasoning about ethics but also to those interested in
the implementation of machine reasoning in general.
We have proposed a generic architecture (see
also (Dennis and Fisher 2017)) which we consider
suitable for explicit ethical machine reasoning which,
among other things, modularises the ethical reasoning
component and so allows some separation of the various
challenges into distinct sub-systems, providing routes
for tackling these problems. None of the challenges
highlighted in this paper are solved by the architecture
but it is our intention in future work to implement the
architecture and use it as a vehicle for tackling the var-
ious practical challenges posed by explicit ethical ma-
chine reasoning.
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